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It is essential that the direction of public policy
be well targeted to the nature of the problem it
is seeking to ameliorate.... But only in the con-
text of prudent, noninflationary expansion of
money and credit are such improvements likely
to be lasting.
—Alan Greenspan, December 18, 1991
Introduction
During periods of slow growth and rising unem-
ployment, the dynamics of the economic policy
debate inevitably reveal an almost irresistible sen-
timent for stimulative monetary policies. To cite a
current example, the steady march of the unem-
ployment rate from 5.3 percent in mid-1990 to 7.3
percent as of April 1,1992 has been matched on
the monetary policy front by persistent calls for
the Federal Reserve to take action that would
ensure an economic recovery regardless of any
longer-term price-level consequences. The dual
circumstances of lower-than-expected inflation
and slow growth of the M2 monetary aggregate
have reinforced this pressure. At the same time,
the reluctance of private-market participants to
fully incorporate recent inflation outcomes in their
inflation expectations, coupled with the persistent
steepness of the yield curve, suggests that infla-
tion fears are very real to the decision-makers
whose behavior ultimately determines the
course of the economy.
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Still, at times like this, there are always many
who feel that the inflationary risk inherent in an
aggressive monetary policy is worth taking if
such a policy can effectively stimulate economic
activity, especially since the costs of recessions
and slow-growth periods are unequally distrib-
uted throughout the population. This sentiment
is forcefully expressed in the book Hard Minds,
Soft Hearts: Tough-Minded Economics for a Just
Society, written by economist Alan Blinder of
Princeton University (see Blinder [1987]). As the
evidence presented in the next section makes
• 1 The spread between three-month T-bil I and 30-year Treasury
bond yields reached a record high of 436 basis points in the week ended
April 24,1992. With respect to inflation expectations, the following quote
is from the April 1992 issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland's
Economic Trends: "The P-Star model, which links the trend in M2 growth
to future inflation, projects continued downward pressure on the inflation
rate through 1993.... Apparently, private forecasters are not as optimistic
about the near-term inflationary trends. The Blue Chip consensus forecast
shows the GDP implicit price deflator edging up to slightly more than 3
percent next year." The first-quarter 1992 number for the deflator indi-
cates that these forecasts are well founded.clear, unemployment disproportionately burdens
lower- and middle-class workers relative to more
affluent Americans, while inflation, to the extent
that it affects income distribution at all, appears to
do just the opposite. In Blinder's words:
Sometimes inflation is piously attacked as the
"crudest tax," meaning that it weighs most heavily
on the poor.... On close examination, the "crudest
tax" battle cry is seen for what it is: a subterfuge for
protecting inflation's real victims, the rich.... [Elvery
bit of evidence I know of points in the same direc-
tion: inflation does no special harm to the poor....
The meager costs that inflation poses on the poor
are dwarfed by the heavy price the poor are forced
to pay whenever the nation embarks on an anti-
inflation campaign.... (p. 54)
Two important features of the evidence to
which Blinder refers deserve further comment.
First, most of the evidence points to the distribu-
tion of income rather than to the level oi income.
The former is a somewhat strange measure of
welfare: I would gladly see you gain a zillion
dollars of real output if doing so would obtain a
billion for me, even if the distribution of our in-
comes becomes more unequal in the process.
Second, and more critically, the evidence cited
by Blinder focuses on cyclical fluctuations in eco-
nomic activity. Few economists believe that lower
unemployment can be "traded" for higher inflation
in the long run. Consequently, a more accurate
statement would be that the meager costs inflation
poses on the poor are dwarfed in the short run
by the heavy price this segment of the population
is forced to pay when the nation embarks on an
anti-inflation campaign.
Some empirical and theoretical arguments
for factoring the long-run costs of inflation into
calculations of the "fairness" of anti-inflation
policies are presented in section II. These argu-
ments refer primarily to the resource cost to the
average individual and thus do not directly
address the fairness issue. However, the argu-
ments do relate inflation to reductions in the
overall level of GDP and hence indirectly bear
on welfare considerations, to the extent that the
burden of falling income is in the long run
shared by the less-than-wealthy.
A more direct argument is presented in sec-
tions III and IV, by way of a simple model that
illustrates how the long-run costs of inflation
arise due to distortions created by a tax system
based on nominal income. Although the world I
consider is highly stylized, it captures some key
elements of the real world: The tax system is im-
perfectly indexed for inflation. There are "rich"
people and "poor" people. Rich people own
capital; poor people do not. The share of the
economic pie earned by rich people is larger
than the percentage of the total population they
represent. Also, inflation raises the tax burden
of the rich relatively more than that of the poor
and, consistent with empirical evidence, does lit-
tle to change the distribution of income.
Within this model, inflation-induced tax in-
creases on capital definitely hurt the poor.
Because inflation effectively raises the tax on
capital, a sustained increase in price-level
growth ultimately results in a lower capital
stock, reduced output, and lower productivity
for all workers. Declining output and productiv-
ity can be expected to fall especially hard on
the poor because they start from a lower stan-
dard of living to begin with.
The example given by this simple model is
not provided as an argument for eschewing dis-
cretionary, short-run stabilization policies as
rationalized by variants of the Phillips curve
model that serve as the foundation of Keynesian
economics — even in its more recent incarna-
tions.
2 Although I am skeptical of the Keynesian
framework, neo or otherwise, as a useful guide
for policymaking, the purpose of this paper is
not to engage in a theoretical or philosophical
quarrel with the proponents of activist monetary
policy.
3 Instead, I attempt to show that the "fair-
ness" objectives that motivate people to urge the
Federal Reserve to "do something" when eco-
nomic activity drags also dictate that the Fed
achieve a long-run goal of maintaining price
stability. In broad terms, I am arguing that, if we
adopt Blinder's arguments as a guide to short-
run monetary policy, we should symmetrically
adopt procedures that provide a long-run
anchor to the price level in order to ensure






The perception that inflation does no special
harm to the poor arises from studies that
• 2 The volumes edited by Mankiw and Romer (1991) are an excel-
lent introduction to some of the important works in the "New Keynesian"
literature.
• 3 Those readers who are interested in such a quarrel are referred to
Barro(1989).TABLE 1
The Effect of Unemployment










































































NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1990, and Economic Report ofthe President, 1991.
examine the effects of macroeconomic variables
on the share of income received by distinct
population quintiles. These share data, col-
lected and reported by the U.S. Department of
Commerce, are obtained by ranking the income
of all households from lowest to highest and
calculating the percentage of total income that
accrues to the first (lowest-income) one-fifth of
households, the second one-fifth of households,
and so on, up to the last one-fifth, who have the
highest incomes in the population.
The effect of macroeconomic activity on these
income shares can be seen by examining the re-
sults of the regressions reported in table 1. The
regressions measure the effect of unemployment
and inflation on the income share of each popula-
tion quintile after controlling for the level of per
capita income, lagged share values (essentially a
catchall for the effects of omitted variables), and a
shift in the income distribution that appears to
have occurred subsequent to 1983.
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The results in table 1 indicate that the burden
of unemployment clearly falls on the lower-
income quintiles. The jobless rate is negatively
related to the share of income received by the
three lowest-income quintiles and is positive for
the upper two.
5 Inflation, on the other hand,
has no statistically significant effect on the dis-
tribution of income.
As indicated by the Blinder quotation in the
introduction, these results are consistent with
the bulk of the evidence on income inequality
in the United States.
6 However, the information
provided by studies of this sort is of a very par-
ticular type. Specifically, the regression results
indicate only that, on a year-to-year basis, infla-
tion does not reduce the relative share of in-
come received by the lower-income quintiles.
They do not tell us anything about the long-run
effects of sustained inflation on the level of in-
come for any particular income class.
In fact, if inflation has adverse effects on the
long-run level of income, the poor may indeed
be hurt — and perhaps hurt disproportionately
in utility terms — even though their relative
• 4 This regression model follows that reported in a recent paper by
Cutler and Katz (1991). Although I use a different sample period than they
do, the results in table 1 are qualitatively similar to their findings. The
post-1983 shift toward greater inequality in income distribution is an
interesting phenomenon that appears to have resulted from a significant
structural shift in the employment patterns of skilled versus unskilled
labor. I recommend the Cutler—Katz paper to those readers interested in a
thorough discussion of this change.
• 5 Note that, by construction, the income shares over all five quin-
tiles must sum to one. Thus, a significant negative effect of some variable
on the income share of one group must be offset by positive effects on
one or more other quintiles.
• 6 Buse (1982) finds a similar resultfor Canada. Specifically, he
discovers that inflation does not significantly affect the share of income
received by different income quintiles. Interestingly, neither does he find
• a significant effect arising from unemployment rates. However, other
labor market variables, specifically the employment and labor participa-
tion rates, are found to influence income distribution, with greater em-
ployment and participation related to less income inequality.income shares are not reduced. I turn now to a
brief overview of the empirical evidence on the






A recent study by Charles T. Carlstrom and William
T. Gavin of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland
attempts a direct comparison of the welfare impli-
cations of the effects of disinflationary policies in
both the short and long run (see Carlstrom and
Gavin [1991]). The authors argue that, in terms of
forgone output for the average individual, the
long-run "shoe-leather" costs of a steady 4 percent
inflation rate are similar in magnitude to the short-
run costs that would typically be attributed to a
tight-money policy that reduced the rate of infla-
tion from 4 percent to zero.
7
More generally, simple correlations do suggest
that economic growth is negatively related to infla-
tion. Using data from the International Financial
Statistics, Gomme (199D reports that "...62 of 82
countries exhibit a negative correlation between
inflation and per capita real output growth." More
complicated statistical examinations — essentially
regressions of cross-country growth rates on a
variety of political and economic variables—yield
mixed conclusions. But, as convincingly argued by
Levin and Renalt (1991), nonrobustness appears
to be a generic weakness of the methodology
employed in such studies.
Two features of these cross-country studies
may help to explain this nonrobustness. First,
there is a subtle point to be made here about
the correlations between growth and inflation.
In standard neoclassical growth models, the
growth rate of the economy is exogenous and
constant. In particular, the growth rate of in-
come is not affected by inflation even though
the level of income is.
8 Thus, the absence of a
significant correlation between inflation and the
long-run growth rate of the economy does not
necessarily imply that a particular level of infla-
tion will fail to reduce per capita income below
the level attainable at lower inflation rates.
Second, the relationship between inflation and
long-run economic performance may operate
through indirect and complicated channels. One
such possibility is the interaction between infla-
tion and the tax system. Although indexing has
been partially implemented in many countries, in-
cluding the United States, extant indexing schemes
are generally insufficient to remove the distortions
created by inflation/tax interactions.
9 Although it
is true that such interactions provide revenue that
might be channeled to productive uses by funding
desirable government expenditures or by reducing
the level of government debt, research in progress
by Charles Carlstrom and me suggests that allow-
ing inflation to interact with the structural tax sys-
tem is not an efficient way to raise revenue.
1
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In the next section, I examine a simple model
economy in which inflation distortions arise
through exactly this channel. Specifically, inflation
is allowed to interact with a tax system based on
nominal wage and capital income. The model is
chosen to illustrate a rather straightforward point
— that inflation can have deleterious long-run
effects on the economic well-being of both the
rich and poor, without affecting either the growth
rate of the economy or the distribution of income.
• 7 Shoe-leather costs are defined as the value of real money balances
that would be held by individuals if the inflation rate were zero instead of 4
percent. An even more dramatic comparison of the welfare costs of short-run
versus long-run changes in economic resources, although one not directly
related to inflation, was given by Robert E. Lucas, Jr. in his 1985 Yrjo
Jahnsson Lectures (see Lucas [1987], section III). He posed the following
question: What is the maximum percentage of per-period consumption a rep-
resentative individual would willingly give up in exchange for 1) a complete
smoothing of short-run (or cyclical) fluctuations in consumption or 2) an in-
crease in the long-run (or trend) growth rate of consumption from 2 to 3 per-
cent? Using plausible values for individual risk preferences, volatility in
consumption, and so on, Lucas argues that the amount of consumption that
would be forgone in exchange for higher long-run consumption growth is
several hundred times the amount that would be given up to eliminate short-
run fluctuations.
• 8 The assumption of exogenous, or policy-invariant, growth rates
typical of the neoclassical growth framework presented here has recently
been challenged by proponents of so-called endogenous growth models.
Good overviews of the neoclassical and endogenous growth frameworks
can be found in two papers by Sala-i-Martin (1990a, 1990b). A short and
informal presentation of the issue is provided in an article entitled "Eco-
nomic Growth: Explaining the Mystery," published in the January 4,1992
edition of The Economist See also Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1990) for
a skeptical empirical assessment of the endogenous growth framework.
• 9 See Altig and Carlstrom (1991b).
• 10 This message is implicit in Altig and Carlstrom (1991a). Bear
in mind that we are not referring to issues related to seigniorage, or the
"inflation tax," per se. See Cooley and Hansen (1989,1991) and Gomme
(1991) for recent analyses of the welfare implications of revenue collec-




To illustrate the argument, I present a simple
general-equilibrium framework that admits two
types of individuals: those who earn income
solely through wages and those who earn both
labor and capital income. Each of the groups
arises endogenously as a result of its preferences.
Members of the first group, who earn only labor
income in equilibrium, allocate their earnings
according to their own life-cycle consumption
needs. Those in the second group care not only
about their own life-cycle consumption, but
also about their children's consumption. These
altruistic impulses effectively make the planning
horizon of this group infinite. They therefore
have a much stronger motive for saving than
the first group and, in equilibrium, end up
owning the entirety of the economy's capital
stock. For simplicity, and with obvious motiva-
tion, the first group will be referred to as "poor"
and the second will be referred to as "rich."
1
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Each generation in this model lives, with abso-
lute certainty, for two periods, which I refer to as
the young and old phases of life. Labor is inelasti-
cally supplied in each period, and the productivity
of labor, identical for rich and poor, is the same
when young and old. I assume that a fraction e of
each generation is rich and 1-e is poor.
1
3 The
population growth rate is assumed to be zero, and
the aggregate capital stock, wages, and the interest
rate are determined by 1) the aggregate production
• 11 The model developed in this section is similar to that presented
in section V(b) of Altig and Davis (1992).
• 12 Some readers may be uncomfortable with the model's implica-
tion that rich people "care" about their children but poor people do not.
Such an implication, however, is more apparent than real. First, the group
I have designated as poor (because they have no capital income) is pre-
sented as nonaltruistic for convenience only. As long as the degree of al-
truism is lower for one group than the other, the equilibrium outcome will
be such that the group with the higher degree of altruism will own the en-
tire capital stock, even if it is more altruistic by an infinitesimally small
amount. Second, a more general model than the one I use here could
allow the effective degree of altruism to be related to an individual's level
of wealth. Thus, a framework in which bequest levels depend on the
serendipitous mortality history of a given family line could result in the
same type of sorting I exploit here, even though the utility functions of all
individuals are identical.
• 13 Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) reportthat, in 1984, some portion of
wealth was held as stock for approximately 25 percent of the families sur-
veyed in the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics. (This
figure does not include equity implicitly held through pension plans.) These
families accounted for approximately 40 percent of total disposable income.
As described below, our model will be parameterized such that 25 percent of
the population holds capital, with the shares of income accruing to the rich
and poor according fairly closely with this evidence.
technology, 2) the government's tax and expen-
diture policy, and 3) the saving and consump-
tion decisions of the two groups.
The government raises revenue by applying
a uniform flat tax rate, p, to nominal labor and
capital income. In other words, the tax code is
not indexed for inflation. Although the actual
U.S. personal tax code is partially indexed, ad-
justments for inflation are far from perfect. In
particular, the indexing provisions in the current
tax code would not vitiate the overstatement of
capital income that is critical for the results
reported here.
Denoting variables associated with the rich by
superscript R and those for the poor by super-
script P, the government's budget constraint is
CD G,+ Tf + Tf
wtL,] ,
where Gt represents government purchases of
output, Tf and T
p are transfer payments to
the rich and poor, respectively, rt is the real
return to capital (the interest rate), wt is the real
wage, 7t, is the exogenously determined infla-
tion rate, At is aggregate capital holdings, and
Lt is aggregate labor supply.
1
5 Government
spending is not productive, nor does it substitute
for private consumption.
In what follows, I examine the steady-state, or
long-run, effects of a change in the inflation rate
on the level of income and lifetime consumption
of the rich and poor. Subscripts indicating time
periods will therefore be dropped. To further
streamline the presentation, superscripts denoting
rich and poor will be suppressed except when
necessary. Readers who have no special interest
in the details of the model can, without loss of
continuity, skip to the next section, which presents
the numerical results.
The utility function of each individual who,
in equilibrium, is rich is given by
(2) U(cv c2, Uk) = In(c,) + p/«(c2) + yU*k,
where cx and c2 denote own consumption in
the first and second period of life, P is a subjec-
tive time-discount factor, U*k is the maximum
attainable utility of the individual's child, and y
is the rate at which a parent discounts his or her
• 14 See Altig and Carlstrom (1991b) fora more detailed discjssion
of inflation indexing in the U.S. personal tax code. The corporate tax code
contains no indexing provisions.
• 15 There is no "money" in the model. Inflation is introduced as the
exogenous rate of depreciation of an arbitrary unit of account.child's utility. If y = 1, parents weight their child's
utility equally to their own. Using analogous
notation, the utility function of each individual
who, in equilibrium, is poor is
(3)
Equations (2) and (3) are maximized subject




where g represents transfers received by children,
b represents transfers given by parents, and a
represents asset holdings. Note that b = g = 0
for individuals with preferences given by equation
(3). Also, recall that a
 p= 0 in equilibrium.
Production is undertaken by profit-maximizing,
competitive firms that apply competitively ob-
tained capital and labor inputs to a Cobb-
Douglas technology, given by
(6) y=*?,
where y and K are, respectively, per capita out-
put and the per capita capital stock, and 9 is a
parameter that measures capital's share of total
output. The profit-maximizing conditions of
firms imply that the aggregate wage and interest






Along with the government's budget constraint
given in equation (1), the specification of the
model is completed by the goods-market and
capital-market clearing conditions. Because capi-
tal does not depreciate and the population is sta-
tionary, government purchases and aggregate
consumption, C, exhaust total output. The capital
stock is simply the sum of asset holdings by the
rich and poor, with the latter, once again, being
zero in equilibrium. The two market-clearing con-
ditions are thus given by
(9) y=G+C
and
(10) K = ea
R+(l-E)a
p.
For both groups, the intertemporal first-order
condition for utility maximization is given by
(11) c2 = p(l +r) c, .
For the group with preferences given by equa-
tion (2), the first-order condition governing
intergenerational transfers, g, is
(12) c2 = ychk,
where q k is the children's first-period consump-
tion. Because every generation's consumption is
the same in a steady-state equilibrium, clk = cv
Equations (12) and (13) thus imply that (3 (1 + r)
= y when the transfer motive is operative for the
group with preferences indicated by (2). Com-
bined with equation (7), this condition implies that





The model is constructed so that the effects of
inflation work through interactions with the tax
system. Thus, as is clear from equation (1), an
increase in the inflation rate (JI) raises the amount
of revenue collected by the government even when
real income (rA + w) is unchanged. Because the
model does not incorporate government debt,
satisfaction of the government budget constraint
requires either an increase in government expen-
ditures, an increase in transfer payments, or some
combination of the two. Aggregate and individual
consumption levels thus depend on the nature of
the fiscal policy regime.
The results of three distinct fiscal policy ex-
periments are presented in this section. In the
"benchmark" model, tax revenues and govern-
ment purchases of real output are endogenously
determined. A second case, which I refer to as
the "progressive-transfer" model, maintains a
constant, exogenous level of government pur-
chases, transferring all surplus revenues to the
poor. Results in the third case, which I call the
"revenue-neutral" model, are obtained by
assuming a constant level of government pur-
chases, with all surplus revenues used to in-
crease transfer payments such that the net tax
payments of each cohort remain constant. Equa-
tions (4) to (13) can be combined to obtain con-
sumption levels under each of the fiscal regimes.



































The results of the three distinct fiscal policy
experiments, presented in table 2, are obtained as-
suming that capital's share of output is 25 percent
(0 = 0.25), the productivity factor in each period
of life (a/, a/, a2
p, and a2
R) equals 0.25, the
subjective discount factor (p) equals 0.778, the in-
come tax rate is 20 percent (p = 0.20), 75 percent
of the population is poor and 25 percent is rich
(e = 0.25), and the rich weight the utility of their
children equally to their own (y = 1).
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For each of the experiments, I calculate the
relative share of income received by the rich
and poor populations, as well as the change in
lifetime consumption for each group in a steady
state as the rate of inflation is increased to 4 per-
cent from the benchmark case with zero infla-
tion. The results in the second row of table 2 are
obtained from the benchmark model (with 4
percent inflation), the results in the third row
correspond to the progressive-transfer model,
and the results in the fourth row are obtained
from the revenue-neutral model.
Table 2 conveys the central message of this
paper: The distribution of income, as measured
by relative shares of personal income (total out-
put less government purchases), is virtually
invariant to the rate of inflation. Despite this,
the lifetime consumption opportunities of the
poor fall by as much as 2.6 percent. Only when
all surplus revenues from inflation are trans-
ferred to the poor is this group unharmed by in-
flation. And even in this case, their lot is not
improved. It is clear, then, that evidence regard-
ing income distribution is of limited value as a
measure of the welfare consequences of infla-
tion on the poor.
1
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More directly, the poor are decidedly hurt by
inflation, even though these adverse conse-
quences do not manifest themselves in lost in-
come shares. It is possible that in a more fully
articulated model, the poor might actually gain
in the short run. However, if the effects of infla-
tion emphasized here capture some important
part of economic reality, such a gain would be
transitory. If inflation is harmful in the long run,
the less affluent will not be exempt.
V. The Moral
of the Story
This paper is a cautionary tale for the "soft
hearted": Attempts to alleviate the burden of
unemployment on the less well-to-do through
expansionary monetary policy may hurt the clien-
tele it is supposed to serve if, ultimately, the policy
leads to higher long-run rates of inflation. This study
is not, however, a criticism of fine-tuning attempts
per se. Current Fed policy may or may not fall vic-
tim to the "too much, too late" syndrome (that is,
too rapid an expansion of the money supply at too
late a stage in the slowdown to prevent upward
pressure on the price level once the recovery begins
in earnest). But if policy mistakes do occur, short-
run monetary medicine could further harm those
who are most affected by recession, slow growth,
and diminished income levels.
Fortunately, the presumed trade-off between a
monetary policy that responds to short-run eco-
nomic circumstances and one that maintains price
stability in the long run is a false exchange. By set-
ting long-run price-level targets collateralized with
credible and clearly articulated enforcement mech-
anisms, the Fed would be free to pursue stabiliza-
tion efforts aggressively without destabilizing
inflation expectations or ultimately risking higher-
• 16 Although the results are sensitive to the choice of e, this
value accords fairly well with evidence concerning the actual distribu-
tion of income. The poor segment of the model population receives a
higher share of total personal income than the rich, but the poor repre-
sent three-quarters of the population. The rich, who make up only one-
quarter of the population, receive almost 44 percent of personal income.
See footnote 13.
• 17 A 2.6 percent reduction may not seem like much, especially
when stacked against the potential costs of unemployment. But 2.6 per-
cent of lifetime consumption may be larger than you think. With a sus-
tainable real consumption level of $20,000 per year, a 55-year planning
horizon, and a 5 percent real rate of return, a loss of this magnitude
would be equivalent to a current lump-sum tax on the order of $10,000,
or half a year's consumption.than-desired inflation paths that are difficult to
reverse after the fact.
Creating such a policy environment is, of
course, easier said than done, but certainly no
more difficult than determining an effective way
to exploit notoriously slippery Phillips curve
trade-offs. Furthermore, institutional rules that
advance price stability while maintaining flexi-
bility over monetary policy choices in the short
run do exist. William Gavin, of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, and Alan Stockman,
of the University of Rochester, have recently
presented such a proposal (see Gavin and
Stockman [1992]). This, and related work, de-
serves the attention of anyone interested in the






This appendix presents steady-state consump-
tion solutions for the rich and poor when young
(that is, for cf and Cj*). Solutions for old-age
consumption are given by these expressions and
equation (11). Asset levels are then given by
equations (4) and (5). Superscripts indicating
rich and poor are suppressed except where
absolutely necessary.
Benchmark Model
In the benchmark model, government expendi-
tures are endogenous. The poor's first-period
consumption is
(a, + a2) [1 - (1+ 7t) p] w
q> (1 + P)
where 9=l + r(l-p)-prc.





where iNkT is all tax revenues net of capital in-
come taxes paid by the rich, C
p is the total con-
sumption by the poor, and L is the (exogenous)
aggregate labor supply. Note that C
R is obtained








I> . + r) - -
p(r+TC) p(r+7t)
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 2 2 ' »
an exogenous lump-sum tax payment of the
poor when young, and t2 is an exogenous
lump-sum tax payment of the poor when old.






Given the consumption solutions for the poor,
the consumption solutions for the rich have the
same form as in the progressive-transfer model.
£ p (p (at + a2) (p + 7t) - XNET '
E(l + Y)[l-<p-p(r+7t)]References
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